Hyper-glide Delivery Systems and the Implications for Strategic Stability and Arms Reductions by Martin, James & Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center on Contemporary Conflict CCC PASCC Reports
2015-04
Hyper-glide Delivery Systems and the
Implications for Strategic Stability and
Arms Reductions
Martin, James




Hyper-glide Delivery Systems  
and the Implications for  








James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
Middlebury Institute of International Studies 
1400 K Street, NW 










This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-13-1-0030 awarded 
by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC San Diego). The views 
expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by speakers, moderators, 
and presenter, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the Naval Postgraduate 
School nor does mention of trade names, commercial partners, or organizations imply 
endorsement by the U.S. Government. 
 i
Table of Contents 
 
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... ii	  
Overview ............................................................................................................................ 1	  
Major Themes ............................................................................................................................. 1	  
Theme 1: Early Developmental Status Leaves Open Questions of Feasibility ....................... 1	  
Theme 2: Absent Technical Information, Fears of HGVs are Impressionistic ....................... 2	  
Theme 3: Operational Aspects of HGVs are Not Well Understood ........................................ 3	  
U.S. Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
Ambitions: Assessing the Risks, Benefits, and Arms Control Implications ................ 5	  
Dennis M. Gormley, University of Pittsburgh 
U.S. Thinking About the Role Such Systems Might Fulfill .................................................... 5	  
Current Program Overview ...................................................................................................... 8	  
Assessing the Risks of CPGS ................................................................................................... 11	  
Assessing the Benefits of CPGS .............................................................................................. 14	  
Alternatives to CPGS ............................................................................................................... 16	  
A Role for Arms Control ......................................................................................................... 17	  
Final Thoughts .......................................................................................................................... 20	  
Russia and Strategic, Conventional Weapons Concerns and Responses .................. 21	  
James M. Acton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Russian Concerns ..................................................................................................................... 22	  
Russian Asymmetric Responses .............................................................................................. 28	  
Russian Symmetric Responses ................................................................................................ 29	  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 33	  
Boost-glide Weapons and U.S.-Chinese Strategic Stability ........................................ 34	  
Joshua Pollack, SAIC 
Hypersonic Weapons Development in China ........................................................................ 34	  
U.S.-Chinese Strategic Dynamics ............................................................................................ 36	  
Pressures on Chinese Nuclear Posture ................................................................................... 38	  
Potential Chinese Responses ................................................................................................... 39	  
Implications and Uncertainties ............................................................................................... 41	  
Appendix A: Workshop Agenda ................................................................................... 43	  





A2AD   Anti-access/area denial 
AHW   Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (U.S. Army)   
ASAT   Anti-satellite 
ASBM   Anti-ship ballistic missile 
BMD   Ballistic missile defense 
CAS   China Academy of Sciences 
CNS   James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies  
CPGS   Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
CSM   Conventional Strike Missile 
CTM   Conventional Trident Modification 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOD   Department of Defense 
GAO   Government Accountability Office 
HGV   Hypersonic Glide Vehicle 
HTV-2 Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (developed by DARPA and 
Lockheed Martin) 
ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile 
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile 
LOW Launch on warning 
MaRV Maneuverable re-entry vehicle 
MIIS Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey 
NFU No First Use 
NPR Nuclear Posture Review 
NRC National Research Council 
PASCC Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army – Navy (China) 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
UGF Underground facility 
USAF U.S. Air Force 
USMC U.S. Marine Corps 











The United States, Russia, and China are all developing advanced conventional weapons often 
referred to as “hyper-glide” or “boost-glide” systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are those 
that travel at more than five times the speed of sound. “Glide” in this context refers to the 
behavior of the system as it reenters the earth’s atmosphere. Reentry is an extremely demanding 
environment, but the possibility of systems that can accurately deliver conventional payloads 
promptly over great distances or evade missile defenses presents obvious military advantages. 
The impact of this new technology on strategic stability with Russia and China is only now 
beginning to command the attention of defense analysts. To examine the impact of hyper-glide 
systems on strategic stability, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the 
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS) conducted a yearlong study 
sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. 
N00244-13-1-0031 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC 
San Diego). 
To complete this study, CNS commissioned three papers examining the impact of hyper-glide 
systems on strategic stability with Russia and China. CNS also hosted an unclassified, off-the-
record workshop to discuss these papers in Washington, DC on 10 July 2014. The event included 
a review of what is publicly known about boost-glide and hypersonic vehicle programs around 
the world today; discussions of their implications for deterrence and strategic stability between 
the U.S., Russia, and China; potential offense-defense interactions; the military rationales for 
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons; other technologies that could play the CPGS 
role; and the potential for arms control, confidence-building, or transparency measures to address 
problems associated with a new class of strategic weapons.  
In this report, the three commissioned papers follow a brief overview of the study’s themes and 
workshop results. The agenda for the workshop and the participant list are attached as 
Appendices A and B. 
Major Themes 
Three major themes emerged from the study. First, hyper-glide programs remain developmental, 
leaving many questions about their feasibility and cost-effectiveness. Second, foreign concerns, 
especially those of Russia and China, are not tightly linked to specific programmatic facts about 
programs under development, but rather reflect general anxiety about the potential impact of new 
technologies. Third, operational aspects of hyper-glide systems, which will have the greatest 
impact on strategic stability, are not yet well understood. These topics were identified in working 
papers and dominated the discussions at the workshop. 
Theme 1: Early Developmental Status Leaves Open Questions of Feasibility	  
First, existing developmental programs have yet to demonstrate that hyper-glide technologies can 
generate reliable and cost-effective weapons systems. The United States and other powers are 
pursuing a number of technological paths toward hyper-glide systems. The United States has 
three service programs under development: the U.S. Air Force’s Conventional Strike Missile 
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(CSM), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Hypersonic Test Vehicle 
no. 2 (HTV-2), and the U.S. Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW). According to 
Dennis Gormley, however, “a combination of risk, the effects of sequestration, and growing 
concern over China’s military ambitions, most notably anti-access area-denial capabilities, make 
two of the three preceding…CPGS options problematic near-term solutions for the CPGS 
mission.” Gormley explains that “the Air Force and DARPA programs have not demonstrated 
sufficient technical progress, while the financial basis for pursuing them has fallen prey to severe 
cuts in the Pentagon budget.”  
The concern over technical feasibility was a major theme at the workshop. One participant 
described the HTV-2 boost-glide development program as a high-risk, non-evolutionary 
approach that did not pay off. The high lift-to-drag ratio needed for a high-speed gliding object 
also introduces greater problems with heating and stress. The AHW hypersonic cruise missile 
program has been evolutionary, by contrast. Another participant stated that the exact amount of 
heating that the HTV-2 glider experienced came as a surprise. A third participant commented 
that different speeds and environments involve different physical “regimes” that we still need to 
understand. The participant closest to the HTV-2 program felt that there were no inherent 
challenges that advanced-technology states could not eventually overcome. 
Many participants believed that the cost of these systems would make them a “niche” program 
only. The participant closest to defense policymaking in the current administration noted that the 
U.S. already has ample conventional stand-off capability. Further, the intelligence requirements 
for the “fleeting targets” that might justify highly prompt systems are very challenging. Medium-
range, sea-based systems could be useful to overcome anti-access/area denial (A2AD) 
challenges. Another participant described this scenario as a “leading-edge attack.” A third 
participant argued for CPGS-type systems to reduce the gap in time before the U.S. military 
could close with an adversary on short notice without using nuclear weapons. Few others present 
seemed persuaded that small numbers of conventional strikes via CPGS systems could provide a 
significant advantage that could not otherwise be realized through alternative means. 
Theme 2: Absent Technical Information, Fears of HGVs are Impressionistic 	  
A second theme that emerged was that other powers, such as Russia and China, formed 
impressionistic fears about the impact of hyper-glide systems that are not strongly correlated 
with the actual technical capabilities or developmental status of current programs. These 
concerns reflect a broader concern about the development of advanced military capabilities. For 
example, James Acton notes in his commissioned paper that “Russian analysts have been very 
explicit in identifying a perceived threat from multiple forms of ‘precision-guided weapons,’ 
including ‘long-range sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles… and powerful air bombs 
and guided missiles, which can be delivered by U.S. heavy bombers and tactical aviation.’” 
Participants at the workshop tended to agree that foreign concerns were often impressionistic and 
based on worst-case scenarios. The participant closest to defense policymaking stated that the 
Russians are “sincerely paranoid” about U.S. missile defense and CPGS investments, and are 
particularly worried about command and control decapitation and coercion in a crisis. The 
American statement during the New START talks that the U.S. did not consider the treaty as 
limiting boost-glide systems reinforced these concerns. Another participant described a recent 
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Track 2 interaction with Russian experts, who displayed a budget document reflecting a large 
increase in air defense programs, reflecting Russian concerns about the U.S. and NATO. Acton 
notes in his paper that Russian analysts express concern that conventional hyper-glide systems 
could be armed with nuclear warheads. 
Another participant described Chinese concerns about conventional counterforce and possible 
decapitation threats, and suggested that the deployment of CPGS-type systems could create 
incentives for the alteration of Chinese operational practices in order to address vulnerabilities 
early in a crisis. Such changes to Chinese practices might have implications for crisis stability, 
arms race stability, or overall relations, depending in large part on how the U.S. leadership 
interprets them. This is a theme Joshua Pollack develops in his paper, in which he argues, “If 
Chinese defense planners have come to regard this emerging ‘complex counterforce’ threat as 
sufficiently serious, it could influence both how Chinese leaders act in a crisis and how they 
choose to posture their strategic forces over the long term.” 
Finally, one participant noted that foreign discussions of these programs tend to assume that any 
U.S. program that has ever appeared in a budget continues to be active in some form. 
Theme 3: Operational Aspects of HGVs are Not Well Understood 	  
The third major theme to emerge was that the operational considerations that would influence 
strategic stability are only lightly appreciated. During the workshop, the idea that foreign 
perceptions were poorly linked to factual information about the status and capability of existing 
programs developed into a generalized observation that operational concepts, and their impact on 
strategic stability, were not yet well understood. 
The general lack of clarity regarding operational aspects of potential future hyper-glide systems 
was clearly reflected in the workshop conversation. One participant claimed that boost-glide 
weapons flying in the upper atmosphere would differ from ballistic missiles because they would 
be difficult to detect after boost phase until they approached radar range. Another participant 
suggested that it would not be difficult to develop new space-based assets designed specifically 
to track the flight of boost-glide weapons, which would be hot, bright objects. A third participant 
observed that because boost-glide weapons would under-fly midcourse BMD systems, a 
substantial buildup of terminal-phase defenses would be required to counter them. Thus, an 
alternative to national coverage would be to invest in area defenses only. One candidate for area 
defense would be the radars associated with BMD systems. It is possible that existing endo-
atmospheric interceptors could stop first-generation boost-glide weapons that did not maneuver 
in the terminal phase. 
The question of “payload ambiguity,” or the idea that incoming missiles could not be identified 
as conventional or nuclear, was also addressed during the workshop. Many participants felt that 
the payload ambiguity question surrounding the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) 
program was overstated. The CTM could have provided a near-term CPGS capability using 
already-built ballistic missiles rather than waiting for boost-glide weapons of the future. CTM 
would be covered by New START, but would not introduce treaty compliance problems in small 
numbers. If a near-term CPGS option is needed, some participants felt that revisiting CTM 
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would be cost-effective and less problematic than developing an entirely new technology like 
boost-glide, whose maneuverability and perhaps also low detectability introduce a new class of 
“destination ambiguity” problems. 
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U.S. Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt 
Global Strike Ambitions: Assessing the Risks, Benefits, and Arms 
Control Implications 
 
Dennis M. Gormley 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
This paper examines the implications of U.S. interest in deploying advanced (high precision) 
conventional strike systems primarily to support the requirement to strike fleeting targets over 
distances of as much as intercontinental range for the purpose of destroying them in roughly one 
hour. America is not alone in pursuing such advanced conventional capabilities, as both Russia 
and China seem to possess similar ambitions. The American program is likely the most advanced 
at this time, and ample public information is available on these programs.1 Given the state of 
knowledge about the status of U.S. programs, this paper focuses primarily on what has prompted 
the United States to pursue such programs, the potential risks and benefits of doing so, and the 
likely arms control implications of embracing such novel means of long-range conventional 
strike.  
 
U.S. Thinking About the Role Such Systems Might Fulfill  
 
At present, the advanced conventional systems examined in this paper support the need for a 
“niche” capability consisting of a small number of conventional weapons that could very quickly 
be employed to destroy “fleeting” targets at the start or in the midst of a military campaign.2 
However, one could imagine more fulsome requirements under future administrations for such 
advanced high-precision long-range conventional weapons.  
 
RAND strategist Albert Wohlstetter played a lead role at the beginning of the 1970s in 
supporting the Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Long-Range R&D project that foresaw the 
potential for radical future advances emanating from the revolution in microelectronics, 
                                                
1 See Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and 
Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R-41464 (May 5, 2014); Joshua Pollack, “Evaluating 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 1 (January/February 2009); James M. 
Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2013); and Dennis M. Gormley, “Sixty Minutes to Strike: Assessing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Arms Control Implications of Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Sicherheit und Frieden (Security & Peace), no. 
1 (January 2014).  
2 The formal requirement for CPGS weapons was established in May 2003. At that time, a quick-fix solution for the 
requirement for such a prompt weapon involved converting a portion of nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles carried on Trident submarines into conventionally armed missiles. The Congress balked at such a course of 
action because of undesirable ambiguity over whether the missile might not be armed with a nuclear or conventional 
warhead. The Obama administration turned instead to emphasize much more advanced solutions under a 
Department of Defense program called “Defense-Wide Conventional Prompt Global Strike.” Three programs are 
included: the Air Force’s Conventional Strike Missile employing boost-glide technologies; the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DAPRA) Hypersonic Test Vehicle No. 2; and the Army’s Advanced Hypersonic 
Weapon. An additional program sits outside of the Defense-wide program under DARPA’s direction—the X-51 
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, a scramjet-driven cruise missile.  
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reconnaissance, communication, navigation and precise guidance for unmanned air systems that 
possessed increasingly long ranges.3 This led later on, in the mid-1980s, to lively debates within 
strategic planning circles regarding options for implementing a so-called “Follow-On Forces 
Attack,” which at the outset of a Soviet ground invasion aimed to attack and thereby slow Soviet 
follow-on forces to improve NATO’s chances of coping with perceived Soviet conventional 
advantages.4 Arguably the most provocative contribution to the notion of conventional global 
strike came from Paul Nitze, who was convinced by early 1994 that it was time for the United 
States to reconsider its longstanding reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Nitze believed 
that U.S. presidents would no longer be willing to employ nuclear weapons to punish aggression 
and that precision-guided conventional weapons “will one day perform their primary mission of 
deterrence immeasurably better than nuclear weapons if only because we can—and will—use 
them.”5 
 
An even more provocative version of long-range strategic conventional strike appeared two years 
after Paul Nitze’s contribution. Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade’s controversial book Shock 
and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance argues that rapid dominance over future adversaries 
required “a level of Shock and Awe . . . on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze 
[an adversary’s] will to carry on.”6 In an accompanying contribution to the book, General Chuck 
Horner (USAF, ret.), observes that “deep strike capabilities” are critically important “in a future 
world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases.” Such deep strikes, Horner believed, 
would require delivery systems with ranges up to 10,000 km.7  Within a year after this 
controversial book appeared, the idea of arming intercontinental missiles with conventional 
warheads reappeared in the congressionally-mandated and bipartisan National Defense Panel, 
which was charged with reviewing and making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 
both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as well as providing an assessment of alternative 
future force structures for the U.S. military through the year 2010. The Panel recommended that 
such conventionally armed ICBMs could provide “a supplement or alternative to nuclear arsenals 
of the Cold War.” The quest to give meaning to the idea of conventional strategic strike finally 
manifested itself in President George W. Bush’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), announced in 
late December 2001. The document sought to conflate previously nuclear-only attack options 
into a new concept called “Global Strike,” thus bringing together advanced conventional and 
tailored nuclear strike options to deal with various regional contingencies requiring prompt 
decision-making.8 
                                                
3 In September of 1972 I joined Harry Diamond Laboratories where many of these revolutionary new developments 
were significantly advanced. I subsequently worked off and on with Albert Wohlstetter until his death in 1997 on 
projects that foresaw how many of these advanced conventional weapon concepts would eventually develop.  
4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces 
Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1987).  
5 Paul H. Nitze, “Is It Time to Junk Our Nukes?” Washington Post, January 16, 1994, C1.  
6 Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, D.C.: NDU 
Press, 1996). http://www/dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.  
7 Ibid., 128 and 131.  
8 The conventional component was to consist of air and ship-launched cruise missiles and regional based attack 
aircraft. Still, nuclear options were seen as needed to deal with such targets as deeply buried strategic facilities 
housing weapons of mass destruction. Ibid., 7. Shortly after the release of the Bush NPR, the U.S. Air Force Space 
Command established a requirement for a prompt global strike capability that could strike anywhere globally and 
defeat, via conventional means, such difficult targets as hard and deeply buried facilities and strategic relocatable 
targets, presumably nuclear-armed mobile missiles. See Dennis M. Gormley, “Conventional Force Integration in 
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The Bush administration’s stab at deploying two conventional missiles on each of its 12 Trident 
submarines (with each missile equipped to carry four conventional warheads), while the 
remaining missiles would still carry nuclear warheads, proved unacceptable to Congress because 
of the nuclear ambiguity issue. According to one congressional staff member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, the demise of Trident’s conversion suggested that there was no 
longer any prospect for either Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or 
Minuteman land-based ballistic missiles undergoing conversion in support of the CPGS 
mission.9 Interestingly, a National Research Council (NRC) review of the CPGS program 
essentially sank the Trident conversion program by arguing that the nuclear ambiguity issue 
could never be completely resolved. The report noted that the Department of Defense had 
presented panel members with scenarios in which CPGS weapons could provide leading edge 
preemptive strike against targets far inland so as to “cripple an adversary’s essential warfighting 
capabilities” before they could be used against U.S. forces.10 The NRC panel saw CPGS’s 
potential role in supporting major combat operations, but only in a qualified sense. The NRC 
correctly noted that such major military operations are likely to be accompanied by strategic 
warning and a buildup of regional forces. Moreover, the use of CPGS in the context of a major 
regional war could be misinterpreted as a nuclear rather than conventional attack, thereby 
fostering unwanted and strong escalatory incentives, especially if the CPGS system was 
delivered by a ballistic missile.11 
 
A final contribution of note with respect to the future of CPGS came from Barry Watts in a long 
monograph published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment in 2005.12 Watts 
argues that long-range strike—more broadly cast than CPGS—is critically central to U.S. 
strategy. This is because of what Watts sees as “the growing ability of accurate, non-nuclear . . . 
munitions to achieve military effects comparable to nuclear weapons, without the collateral 
damage of nuclear employment. . . .” (Author emphasis).13 Thus, unlike during the Cold War, 
Watts believes that precision conventional weapons can now be used for more than deterrence 
purposes. While Watts looks at this as good news, he is deeply concerned that the U.S. Air Force 
has not taken a sufficiently aggressive approach to maintaining America’s long-range strike 
advantage, particularly over the mid- to long-term timeframe. Should the United States face a 
“second nuclear age” over the long run—consisting of cascading nuclear proliferation—it will 
forfeit a number of important strategic opportunities and challenges, asserts Watts. 
Consequently, America risks losing its current advantage in conventional strategic strike, which 
could slow its wish to achieve deep nuclear reductions and address the rise of Asian powers, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Global Strike,” in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen, eds., Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine 
(New York: Palgrave, 2005), 53-68.  
9 My thanks to Miles Pomper of the Middlebury Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies for this 
information. 
10 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability,” Letter Report of the National Research Council’s Committee on 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, May 11, 2007.  
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11951.html. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Barry D. Watts, Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency, and Options (Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 2005). 
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2005/04/long-range-strike-imperatives-urgency-and-options/Watts served as 
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) in the Pentagon from May 2001 to July 2002.  
13 Ibid., i.  
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among other things.14 To take full advantage of U.S. core long-range strategic strike advantages, 
Watts believes that a better balance needs to be struck between heavy investments in short-range 
strike, where Air Force preferences lie, and long-range strike. 
 
Watts distinguishes truly prompt long-range strike from less prompt long-range strike. In the 
former case, he sees only rare occasions when the need will arise to strike within a very short 
period of time. For these “rare occasions,” Watts would err on the side of cost and technical 
feasibility, which, he argues, favor an existing launch vehicle, such as Peacekeeper or 
Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, coupled with a maneuverable hypersonic glide 
vehicle—also known as the Common Aero Vehicle or CAV—slated to carry around 450 kg of 
conventional munitions. Absent a turn for the worse toward a “second nuclear age,” Watts 
believes that it might be possible to avoid altogether the need for such a prompt strike capability 
because, in his view, the vast majority of long-range strike targets, even ones that are fleeting, 
can best be dealt with by a capability that permits loitering or dwelling close enough to where the 
target might emerge from hiding. Besides emphasizing the importance of long-range and 
survivability requirements, Watts avers that the chief problem regarding this challenge is 
determining how much speed is truly needed, either in regard to the long-range platform or its 
expendable munitions. In this regard, he argues that not more than Mach 2.5 would suffice.15 
 
Current Program Overview  
 
Three key service programs are now center stage under the consolidated CPGS program. The 
U.S. Air Force began the Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) program in 2008, and after the 
demise of the U.S. Navy’s attempt to offer the Trident missile as the quickest and most effective 
path to a CPGS option, the Air Force CSM now occupies the lead position. Based on land—
probably either on the U.S. west or east coast—the CSM would employ boost-glide technologies 
and follow a substantially lower depressed trajectory than existing nuclear-armed ballistic 
missiles. After separation, the payload would travel hypersonically to the target while having the 
capacity to execute substantial cross-range maneuver. Two benefits flow from such 
maneuverability: high accuracy and avoiding flight over hostile countries. The Air Force had 
hoped to reach an operational capability by 2012 (with one ready missile and two spares), but it 
now appears that the CSM might not be ready until well after the middle of this decade. This is 
due to the substantial testing that remains for reentry bodies that must undergo at least five 
demonstration flights. To date, the CSM has not undergone any successful hypersonic flight 
tests.16  
 
The second CPGS contender is the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle no. 2 (HTV-2), funded by 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The goal of the HTV-2 is the 
development of a vehicle that can ride along the earth’s upper atmosphere at hypersonic speeds 
of more than 13,000 miles per hour. America’s largest defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, is 
developing the vehicle, which will also serve as the payload delivery vehicle for the Air Force 
CSM program. However, after two flight test failures (2010, 2011), and the brief achievement of 
                                                
14 Ibid., ii.  
15 Ibid., iv.  
16 Woolf., Summary.  
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a speed of Mach 20, it is clear that the vehicle thus far cannot maintain aerodynamic control for a 
full flight test, much less the entire objective mission distance. Given the tight defense budget 
that is likely to prevail for some time, the Pentagon decided to allocate a mere $2m in the 
FY2014 budget, which will not support further HTV-2 testing while the Pentagon seeks a 
cheaper, less risky CPGS alternative.17 
 
The third option under the consolidated Pentagon CPGS program is the U.S. Army’s Advanced 
Hypersonic Weapon (AHW), which from the outset was seen as a way to reduce the risk 
associated with DARPA’s HTV-2 endeavor. Indeed, the AHW’s one flight test in November 
2011 was successful, allowing the hypersonic glide vehicle to achieve a range of 2,400 miles. 
However, the program’s most recent test on August 26, 2014 failed four seconds after launch 
“due to an anomaly.” 18  Of course, the AHW’s shorter range would necessitate forward 
deployment to meet the needs of the CPGS mission. Nevertheless, unlike its more challenging 
DARPA cousin, the army’s AHW received Pentagon support for modest additional funding in 
FY2014 to permit one more test, which of course failed.19 The consequences for further funding 
remain to be seen.  
 
A combination of risk, the effects of sequestration, and growing concern over China’s military 
ambitions, most notably anti-access area-denial capabilities, make two of the three preceding 
DOD-wide CPGS options problematic near-term solutions for the CPGS mission. The Air Force 
and DARPA programs have not demonstrated sufficient technical progress, while the financial 
basis for pursuing them has fallen prey to severe cuts in the Pentagon budget. The challenge of 
Chinese military modernization, on the other hand, has led to the Obama administration’s modest 
“Pivot to East Asia” strategy announced in January 2012, amounting thus far to a rebalancing of 
only 180 U.S. Marines who arrived in Australia in April 2012, with a larger contingent of around 
2,000 to possibly follow by 2017.20 China’s military challenge and the necessity to rebalance 
forces have re-focused attention on a sea-based CPGS option, but one without the launch 
ambiguity problem that led to the cancellation of the Conventional Trident Missile option in 
2008. The FY2014 budget request for the CPGS program remains steadfast in its interest in sea-
based options including a flight test of a navy variant of a CPGS system toward the end of 
2016.21 To avoid contaminating this sea-based option, were it to be affiliated with the Trident 
submarine’s principal mission of nuclear delivery, Virginia-class attack submarines would 
instead be modified to accommodate a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) intended 
for conventional delivery in at least two new launch tubes originally designed for carrying 
Tomahawk cruise missiles.22 Although such a solution would lack the range and truly prompt 
                                                
17 Ibid., 18-19.  
18 “U.S. Army’s Hypersonic Missile Fails During Test,” DefenseNews [Digital Edition], August 26, 2014. 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140825/DEFREG02/308250004/US-Army-s-Hypersonic-Missile-Fails-
During-Test.  
19 Woolf., 19-20.  
20 J. Dana Stuster, “The Obama administration just can’t seem to pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2013. 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/07/the_obama_administration_just_cant_seem_to_get_its_asia_pivot_ri
ght.  
21 Woolf, op. cit., 12.  
22 Elaine M. Grossman, “Pentagon Unveils New Plan for Conventional Submarine-Based Ballistic Missiles,” 
National Journal, updated, May 29, 2013. http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/pentagon-unveils-new-
plan-for-conventional-submarine-based-ballistic-missiles-20120127.   
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response time of U.S.-based ICBMs, it might prove a more palatable solution, while still offering 
some modest support to the Obama pivot to East Asia strategy. 
 
The Obama administration has embraced long-range conventional strike along with missile 
defenses as enabling America’s interest in reducing its historic reliance on nuclear weapons. The 
2010 NPR notes the important contributions that conventional weapons make to U.S. regional 
deterrence and reassurance goals. The document also signals to regional allies and friends that 
such conventional options are sufficiently critical that the United States will preserve options in 
the New START treaty for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in conventional 
roles.23  
 
Russia initially sought to ban conventional warheads on strategic ballistic missiles, but the 
United States balked at the prohibition and instead agreed to a statement in the New START 
agreement’s preamble indicating that both parties are “mindful of the impact of conventionally 
armed ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles] on strategic stability.” 24  In the end, even though the treaty does not restrict 
conventionally armed ICBMs, it counts those delivery systems as treaty-limited strategic 
delivery systems under New START’s ceiling of 1,550 nuclear warheads.25  
 
The White House’s interpretation of the New START treaty became evident in a February 20, 
2011 report to Congress stipulating that while the treaty did count existing types of strategic 
delivery vehicles if they were converted to carry conventional warheads, this proviso did not 
apply equally to new types of delivery vehicles that do not “fly a ballistic trajectory over most of 
its flight path.”26 Accordingly, new types of warheads deployed on boost-glide systems, whose 
rocket-boosted payload delivery vehicles glide at hypersonic speeds in the atmosphere, would 
not be counted as nuclear warheads. The White House also acknowledged that it had at the time 
no plans to deploy conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs with traditional trajectories, which 
would be counted as nuclear systems under New START. On the other hand, it was investing in 
boost-glide systems launched by non-traditional boost vehicles to place a glide vehicle that 
would obtain hypersonic speeds while traveling in the earth’s upper atmosphere before 
delivering its conventional payload. Although these new boost-glide systems are not subject to 
New START counting rules, the administration argues that they should avoid the ambiguity 
question because of their unique, non-ballistic flight profile. Yet, because such systems cannot be 
tracked and possess significant maneuverability after the boost phase, they still could present 
escalatory risks.27 
 
                                                
23 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense: April 2010), 25. 
http://www.defense.gov/npr/.  
24 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” April 8, 2010, 2. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.  
25 Ibid., 4.  
26 Tom Z. Collina, “U.S. Alters Non-Nuclear Prompt-Strike Plan,” Arms Control Today, April 11, 2011. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_04/PromptStrike.  
27 James M. Acton, Silver Bullet: Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), xiv.  
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Assessing the Risks of CPGS 
 
It seems evident that the prospective use case for such a niche CPGS capability falls into the 
category of a low probability but potentially high consequence eventuality. Analysts have used 
the case of al Qaeda’s surprise attack on 9/11 and the consequent need for prompt response 
options as a justification for developing such capabilities. Admittedly, the U.S. military faced 
decided disadvantages vis-à-vis promptly striking fleeting al Qaeda targets. Yet the chances even 
today of having in hand all of the required intelligence support necessary to achieve success with 
one or several CPGS missiles seems highly doubtful. Indeed, subsequent analyses of what we 
knew about Osama bin Laden’s location in Afghanistan after 9/11 points strongly to bin Laden 
being in Tora Bora, but not with enough accuracy to think that a few missiles would have 
succeeded in targeting him effectively. On the other hand, a higher probability of preventing bin 
Laden and his followers’ escape into Pakistan certainly existed but was reportedly rejected by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, the regional commander-in-
chief. They both perceived the risks of deviating from the light footprint, small-force plan they 
executed against Afghanistan as too high.28 Obviously, there are other examples where promptly 
striking a fleeting, but temporarily fixed, target might seem imperative. The Pentagon’s Defense 
Science Board outlined five representative cases, including responding to a U.S. satellite being 
shot down by a near-peer competitor; destroying nuclear materials that a terrorist organization 
had located temporarily in a neutral country; a small WMD package located temporarily in a 
neutral country; a fleeting terrorist group gathered temporarily in a neutral country; and a rogue 
state threatening to use a nuclear weapon against an allied nation.29 
 
However compelling the argument for a prompt decision, the unintended but plausible 
consequences of deploying CPGS weapons seem formidable. The first is fear that arming 
ballistic missiles with conventional warheads might adversely affect strategic stability by virtue 
of the preemptive or preventive character of the weapon. Surely, any state perceiving that it is in 
the gun sights of a CPGS weapon might figure that it too needed to adjust its posture to achieve 
their own prompt capability. After the Bush administration elevated preemption/prevention to a 
national doctrine in 2002, a host of states followed suit, including both adversaries and some 
close allies of the United States, such as Japan.30 Today, Japan seems bent on putting aside 
longstanding constitutional constraints on possessing offensive military forces, most notably an 
independent long-range strike capability—quite possibly ballistic missiles—to achieve 
preemptive results against such targets as North Korean missiles on high alert or Chinese forces 
preparing to invade the disputed Senkaku Islands.31 U.S. fascination with CPGS deployments 
may have provided Japan welcome cover to turn to such an option itself. 
                                                
28 “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today,” A Report to Members of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 111th Congress, First Session, November 30, 2009. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT53709.htm.  
29 Woolf, op. cit., 5. 
30 These developments are discussed in Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and 
the Threat to International Security (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 125-133 and 136-145.  
31 This is not the first time Japan has entertained developing a ballistic missile for preemptive purposes. In October 
2004 the Japanese Defense Agency indicated interest in studying the need for such a capability, and then focused on 
enemy missile launch facilities. However, the plan was dropped soon after its acknowledgement due to coalition 
political pressure, and Japanese interest in such a strike capability turned to cruise missiles instead. On current 
Japanese long-range strike ambitions, see “U.S. worried by aggressive military posture,” Japan Times, August 7, 
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Strategic stability is also threatened by the ambiguity over whether an incoming CPGS missile is 
armed with a conventional or nuclear payload. As noted at the outset, Russian analysts assert that 
CPGS augurs a future U.S. capacity to conduct effective counterforce strikes on their strategic 
nuclear forces, enabling the United States to threaten Russia’s retaliatory capability without 
resort to nuclear weapons. If this perception prevails, then the potential for Russia mistakenly 
perceiving either one or two CPGS weapons as a leading edge attack—conventional or nuclear—
against their nuclear arsenal is not entirely farfetched. Attempts to mitigate these worries through 
various confidence-building and transparency measures might allay some underlying concern 
pertaining to replacing a CPGS missile’s conventional payload for a nuclear one. Still, such 
measures cannot confidently eliminate a state’s potential for erratic behavior under the 
extraordinarily compressed circumstances of a CPGS scenario. Context, as always, is critical, but 
prompt decision-making comes with its own inherent dangers. 
 
A second important dimension of risk lies in a firm appreciation of the important differences 
between nuclear and conventional weapons. The performance of a modest number of U.S. 
precision-guided munitions in the first Gulf War of 1991 augured the expectation that precision 
weapons might one day replace nuclear weapons for some missions. In 2008 one U.S. Strategic 
Command officer stated that conventional weapons were capable of destroying 10 to 30 percent 
of extant nuclear targets.32 That said, proponents of nuclear weapons remain steadfast in their 
belief that the sheer scale of nuclear effects, compared with conventional weapons, contributes 
critically to their deterrent value. Whether one agrees or not with this distinction in regard to its 
outcome for deterrence, there is little debate about difference in scale and effects between 
nuclear and conventional weapons. 
 
Thus, what separates nuclear from conventional weapons is the reality that their huge difference 
in scale greatly compensates for expected errors in weapon accuracy or target uncertainty. 
Compared with nuclear weapons, precision conventional weapons depend critically on an array 
of supporting needs. This includes, first and foremost, highly accurate and swiftly completed 
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; rigorous mission planning; precise 
knowledge of the target’s aim points (i.e., its vulnerabilities); post-attack damage assessment 
capabilities to determine whether or not damage objectives have been achieved and whether or 
not additional strikes are necessary; and, finally, an agile command and control system to 
manage these complex, interconnected tasks. Consequently, while nuclear weapons are forgiving 
due to their comparatively large-scale effects, conventional weapons, no matter how precise, 
cannot afford a breakdown in the performance of their supporting cast of functions if they are to 
succeed as planned. Therefore, while the sum of the CPGS concept’s desired performance is 
certainly greater than the parts, each part critically enables the concept’s objective synergy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
2013, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/07/national/u-s-fretting-over-japans-desire-to-militarily-strike-
enemy-bases/#.UgfBcuBQNjA and J. Michael Cole, “Japan Mulls a Preemptive Strike Capability,” The Diplomat, 
June 4, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/06/04/japan-mulls-a-preemptive-strike-capability/. On 
the earlier effort in 2004, see Gormley, Missile Contagion, 10.  
32 Elaine M. Grossman, “A Former Nuclear Commander Not Wild About Nukes,” Global Security Newswire, May 
28, 2008. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/a-former-nuclear-commander-not-wild-about-nukes/ 
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The disparate parts of the overall CPGS concept have yet to be articulated with clarity or 
introduced to all of the conceivable stakeholders within the U.S. military. This was the 
conclusion of a thorough investigation of the CPGS program by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008.33 The study concentrated most on the disparate enabling 
technologies needed to make CPGS conceivable. They included, “Intelligence collection and 
dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and 
battlefield damage assessment.” The GAO found that the Pentagon had not coordinated its 
efforts to improve these critical enabling components of CPGS.  
 
A third dimension to CPGS risk is its essential dependence on intelligence support. This facet of 
risk should be seen as the Achilles heel of the CPGS concept. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, as noted, called for “exquisite” intelligence to support precise attacks a little less than 
15 months before the invasion of Iraq occurred to destroy the inaccurately assessed stockpile of 
Iraqi WMDs.34 General James Cartwright, formerly Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
drew attention to the stiff demands of intelligence when he observed that success “encompasses . 
. . the ability to plan rapidly, to apply the precision to the intelligence and gather that intelligence 
in a very rapid manner.”35 Yet, the fact that such decision-making and its accompanying 
planning may have to occur within an hour’s timeframe places unprecedented demands on the 
intelligence community. Commenting on the quality of intelligence needed to support CPGS use 
in 2007, CIA director General Michael Hayden observed, “if you are going to strike suddenly . . . 
it has to be based on very powerful, very convincing intelligence.”36 Regarding General 
Hayden’s remarks, Amy Woolf added, “most analysts agree that the United States does not yet 
have the capability to meet the intelligence demands of the PGS mission.”37  
 
One illustration underscores the dubiousness of ever meeting the CPGS concept’s enormously 
stiff intelligence demands—that of providing the president with a counterforce option against a 
rogue state’s decision to launch a nuclear missile. More often than not the implied or stated 
rogue state is North Korea, arguably the most opaque of all intelligence challenges. Both the 
South Korean and U.S. intelligence communities failed altogether to “promptly” detect the death, 
in 2011, of Kim Jong Il. Only several days after his death was announced on North Korean 
television did American decision-makers become aware of this critically important transition. 
Nor did the U.S. intelligence community promptly detect evidence that North Korea had 
undertaken the construction of a huge uranium enrichment facility until roughly 18 months after 
it began—and then only because U.S. physicist Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University was 
invited by North Korea to inspect the plant.38 In principle, a missile launch might be more 
                                                
33 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Military Transformation: DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of 
Its Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for Acquiring Needed Capabilities,” 
GAO-08-325, April 2008. Asked to comment on the GAO’s findings, the Department of Defense concurred with 
each of the GAO’s findings. In my experience as an advisor to several DARPA office directors during the 1990s, I 
found that technology considerations rather than conceptual ones virtually always dictated decision-making.  
34 On enduring intelligence weaknesses, see Dennis M. Gormley, “The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons,” 
Survival, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), 7-28.  
35 Cited in Woolf, op.cit., 4.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Mark Landler and Choe Sang-Hun, “In Kim’s Undetected Death, Sign of Nation’s Opacity,” New York Times, 
December 19, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/asia/in-detecting-kim-jong-il-death-a-gobal-
intelligence-failure.html?pagewanted=alll.  
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subject to detection than these examples, but knowing such details as, for example, whether or 
not the missile is armed with a nuclear warhead and precisely what are the intentions of North 
Korea’s leadership are highly likely to remain opaque. Thus, taking a decision to launch a CPGS 
weapon under such circumstances is likely to be fraught with ambiguity and highly prone to 
unwanted mistakes.  
 
Adding to the likelihood of intelligence error is the strong tendency within the inner councils of 
government decision-making to ignore information that is inconsistent with the desired 
consensus for a particular course of action. As Janne Nolan writes in Tyranny of Consensus, a 
new book that examines several cases of strategic surprise, “The premises guiding American 
strategic planning all too frequently prove to be at odds with the actual nature of the challenges 
involved—the so-called facts on the ground.”39 If the past is prologue to the future, historic 
failures to accurately comprehend the true character of the threats we have faced do not produce 
comfort about taking decisive action. This leaves decision-makers hardly any time to fully 
appraise the direct and potential unintended consequences of their actions.40  
 
The last two administrations have endorsed the requirement for CPGS, though with differences 
in their articulation of just why such a capability is needed. The Bush administration seemed 
inclined toward a global strategic perspective, not least by joining the notion of strategic 
conventional capabilities with nuclear weapons to represent one of the three legs of the new 2002 
triad. On the other hand, the Obama administration’s support of the goal of nuclear abolition has 
fostered a more regional approach, yet one that by no means has caused the Obama White House 
to discard the idea of booster rockets and hypersonic glide vehicles capable of supporting global 
strikes in one hour’s time. Pressed as it is to justify diminishing the importance of nuclear 
weapons, the Obama administration has correspondingly elevated the importance of the 
increasing U.S. dependence on its current and foreseeable advantages in conventional precision 
strike, prompt or otherwise. Yet, the question remains: are the benefits associated with procuring 
even a limited CPGS capability—much less a more fulsome one—worth the risks that might 
follow from employing or even possessing such a capability?  
 
Assessing the Benefits of CPGS 
 
Both the Bush and Obama administrations have fixed on two chief benefits accruing to 
possessing the capacity to strike targets any place on earth within 60 minutes. The first is an 
admittedly rare low probability but high consequence situation wherein a fleeting terrorist target 
with a presumed nuclear weapon is detected in a neutral country. Alternatively, a rogue state 
such as North Korea—or perhaps in the future, Iran—places what appears to be a nuclear 
warhead on a missile capable of striking U.S. or allied territory. The second benefit deriving 
                                                
39 Janne Nolan, Tyranny of Consensus: Discourse and Dissent in American National Security Policy (New York: 
The Century Foundation Press, 2013), 1. 
40 Take, for example, the Clinton administration’s clumsy handling of a prompt response to al Qaeda’s brazen 
attacks in Africa of two American embassies in August 1998. Cruise missiles were fired, without notable 
consequence, against six al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and the Al Shifa pharmaceutical complex in Khartoum, 
Sudan, thought to be producing chemical weapons, but without full proof. The controversy over the 1998 attack—
occurring during the Monica Lewinsky scandal—notably diminished the public’s appreciation of the magnitude of 
the al Qaeda threat.  
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from possessing a CPGS capability is that it reduces the possibility that the United States might 
have to employ nuclear weapons to defend its interests.41 
 
The first benefit seems both remote and problematic in execution—and certainly a scenario for 
which alternative if less prompt means of response are widely available. But far more worrisome 
than such low probability threats occurring is the higher likelihood of mistakes emerging due to 
the sheer difficulty of possessing convincing intelligence but nonetheless taking preemptive 
action anyway. As noted earlier, preemptive strike doctrines coupled with long-range means of 
attack have spread widely on Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East to allies, friends, 
and potential enemies alike. Adding yet another hair-trigger capability, at the same time that the 
United States is strongly emphasizing the importance of “strategic stability” as a critical 
component in reducing global nuclear stockpiles, is inconsistent with that objective and 
potentially dangerous.  
 
Strategic stability may also be adversely affected due to the unintended consequences of 
possessing a first-strike weapon, albeit a conventional one, that in principal threatens a rogue 
state’s nuclear capability. In 2002, President George W. Bush branded Iraq, North Korea, and 
Iran as comprising an “axis of evil,” and then ordered a preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
There is little doubt that such a decision exacerbated North Korea and Iran’s security dilemma 
and accelerated at least North Korea’s quest to achieve its nuclear objectives.42 Facing a “bolt-
out-of-the-blue” CPGS is likely to drive such threatened states to eventually place their own 
limited nuclear capability on hair-trigger alert.43 Fostering such “use it or lose it” incentives is 
surely not what even promoters of CPGS originally had in mind, but it’s nonetheless likely to 
accompany any decision to deploy even a niche CPGS capability.  
 
The second benefit assumed to apply to CPGS is avoiding the necessity to call upon using 
nuclear weapons instead. But what is the likelihood that any of the scenarios that might justify 
deploying a capability to execute a precision conventional strike any place on earth in 60 minutes 
would alternatively merit first use of nuclear weapons by an American president? Indeed, since 
the Obama administration took office in January 2009, there has been a modest turn toward 
looking at reducing the role of nuclear weapons to one of last resort—useful only as an ultimate 
reserve option to threaten retaliation in response to a nuclear attack on the United States or its 
allies. It is also important to recall that even Paul Nitze, in his 1994 article, argued that while 
conventional smart weapons would suffice for deterrence purposes, nuclear weapons were 
unlikely to deter regional aggressors and that U.S. presidents would be unwilling to use them to 
punish aggression.44 Other senior decision-makers would seem to agree. Secretary of Defense 
                                                
41 Woolf, op. cit., 39.  
42 The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programs judged that Iran had halted its nuclear 
weapons program in 2003, which lasted at least several years. See 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf.  
43 Such a hair-trigger capability would require such states to possess a solid-fuel delivery system, which over the 
next decade seems unlikely in the case of North Korea. Iran, on the other hand, has tested a solid propellant 
2,200km-range ballistic missile, the Sajjil-2, which are far less vulnerable to preemptive U.S. attacks and also 
provide Iran, in the future, the capacity to conduct preemptive attacks of its own due to their short readiness times 
compared with liquid-fuel missiles. See Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 
2010).  
44 Nitze, op. cit.  
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Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk both came to view nuclear weapons as 
essentially “unthinkable” for political and moral as well as military reasons.45 After the 1991 
Gulf War, Colin Powell dismissed the utility of nuclear use, while his commander-in-chief, 
President George H.W. Bush, acknowledged in his memoir, co-written with his national security 
advisor Brent Scowcroft, that he had ruled out a nuclear response in the 1991 Gulf War.46  
 
However, because of the risks and ambiguities associated with CPGS, instead of making nuclear 
weapons use more remote, they risk increasing the chances of them being used. Thus, rather than 
reducing the circumstances under which the United States might have to resort to nuclear use, 
particularly for the kind of scenarios (fleeting terrorist groups with WMD or a rogue state 
apparently brandishing a nuclear missile) that CPGS supporters worry about, possessing CPGS 
weapons could actually increase the number of circumstances where the United States might 
have to resort to nuclear use. 
 
Alternatives to CPGS 
 
If the risks outweigh the benefits of deploying CPGS systems, as argued here, are there 
conventional alternatives that might in fact compensate for refraining from deploying CPGS 
systems? There are a variety of conventional weapon systems that would take longer to reach the 
intended target but would compensate in a variety of ways. As Barry Watts has argued, most 
targets, especially fleeting ones, would be more readily detected were the weapon system 
capable of loitering once it reaches the target area. And during the time differential between a 
CPGS and its slower alternative, the latter system could be updated with the latest intelligence on 
the intended target’s location. Although the American Tomahawk cruise missile has been around 
since the 1970s, the current Block IV Tomahawk, called the “Tactical Tomahawk,” can be 
remotely controlled after launch to redirect the missile to an entirely new target. The latest 
version of the missile, which costs roughly half of its predecessor, can be programmed at launch 
to attack 15 different targets as well as to redirect to a newly detected one. Equipped with a video 
camera, the Tactical Tomahawk can loiter for hours over the target area, awaiting the emergence 
of its target. Without even considering what U.S. Air Force systems might contribute, Table I, 
below, indicates that there are ample stores of Tomahawk cruise missiles available to support 
U.S. security needs. Each of the four recently converted Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, 
now called guided missiles submarines or SSGNs, can carry up to 154 Tactical Tomahawks, up 
to 102 special forces troops, mini-subs for covert SEAL units, and small UAVs for supporting 
reconnaissance needs. Perhaps most important of all, and unlike previous Tomahawk missiles, 
the new Tactical Tomahawk has greatly reduced the amount of time it takes to plan a mission, 
which reportedly now requires just 60 minutes.47  
 
                                                
45 Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), 30.  
46 See Colin Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 
1995), 323-324, 485-486, and 540-541 and George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New 
York: Knopf, 1998), 463.  
47 Steven Russell, “Stick with Tomahawk, Forget LRASM,” Breaking Defense, online, July 12, 2013. 
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/12/stick-with-the-tomahawk-forget-lrasm/  
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If for some reason an SSGN were not patrolling within reach of a fleeting target of supreme 
interest that warrants a prompt conventional strike, the U.S. Air Force possesses ample stockpiles 
of AGM-86 cruise missiles, and has announced plans for a new cruise missile to replace it, 
possibly with all of the features that make the Tactical Tomahawk suitable for loitering and 
target reprogramming. In sum, the alternative conventional means of attack, when compared to 
the benefits and dangers associated with CPGS weapons, suggest that the United States can 
safely forgo deployment of CPGS weapons. 
 
Table 1. Potential Tomahawk Cruise Missiles for Contingency Use 
Cruise Missile Carriers  Ships/Subs Total Missiles 
Providence-class submarine 24 480 
Seawolf-class submarine 3 60 
Virginia-class submarine 22 440 
Ohio-class SSGN submarine 4 616 
CG-52-73 Ticonderoga 22 1,342 
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 72 3,240 
DDG-1000 Zumwalt 3 120 
Total 150 6,276 
Note: For vessels with the Mk. 41 Vertical Launcher, half the cells are for cruise missiles. This 
chart is modified from Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, “The Air-Space Threat to Russia.”48  
 
A Role for Arms Control  
 
A critically important motivating factor in examining CPGS weapons is to allay Russian 
concerns that American conventional superiority will threaten their nuclear arsenals as future 
reductions take place along the path to either very low numbers (e.g., a few hundred) or complete 
abolition of nuclear weapons. CPGS delivery systems equipped with appropriately designed 
penetrators and possessing an accuracy of five meters could, in principle, threaten Russian silo-
based nuclear missiles. Indeed, Russian analyses argue that the combination of uncontrolled 
American missile defenses and conventional strategic arms (notably, CPGS and Tomahawk 
cruise missiles) threaten the survivability of their strategic nuclear arsenal—especially as the 
arsenal grows smaller with deeper nuclear cuts.49  
 
Before addressing what type of controls and measures may be required to allay concerns about 
American conventional strike systems, it is important to note once again the differences between 
nuclear and conventional weapons. Briefly put, compared with precision conventional weapons, 
nuclear weapons are vastly more unforgiving due to the sheer scale of their damage. They also 
depend far less than conventional weapons do on a host of supporting functions, any one of 
which, should it fail, would lead to systemic malfunction. Where two nuclear ICBMs may 
                                                
48 Eugene Miasnikov, “The Air-Space Threat to Russia,” in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Missile 
Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013). 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Missile_Defense_book_eng_fin2013.pdf 
49 See Ibid.; Eugene Miasnikov, “Counterforce Capabilities of Conventional Strategic Arms,” Presentation at 
ISODARCO XXVI Winter Course “New Military Technologies: Implications for Strategy and Arms Control, 
January 6-13, 2013, at www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/Miasnikov-PGM-130110.pdf.  
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suffice to achieve a high probability of disabling a Russian ICBM silo, as many as five to nine 
CPGS missiles, according to one Russian calculation, would likely be needed to achieve roughly 
the same outcome.50 This begs the question—admittedly one more political than technical—of 
how or why any sane U.S. president could be convinced to count on achieving perfect or near-
perfect success in any conventional counterforce strike against Russian nuclear targets, on land, 
at sea, and in the air. The consequences of imperfection are unacceptable and devastating; that is, 
the near certain probability of Russian nuclear missiles destroying major American cities, with 
millions of deaths. The Russian media is replete with stories about Russian ICBMs being capable 
of making evasive maneuvers against missile defenses, as well as carrying countermeasures and 
decoys to assure penetration of even thick defenses, no less the decidedly limited type of U.S. 
missile defense system now deployed in Alaska and California.51  
 
Russian analysts evoke grave concern about the ability of American Tomahawk cruise 
missiles—particularly the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk—to disable their ICBM silos were they 
to be equipped with shaped-charge rather than blast fragmentation warheads, as some of them 
are today.52 Nevertheless, Russia could respond to such a threat by ringing their silo fields with 
S-400 anti-aircraft systems to furnish point defense against such a slow-flying system as a 
Tomahawk missile. That measure alone would surely inject sufficient uncertainty about 
achieving perfect or near-perfect success for any such large-scale attack. Nevertheless, Russian 
analysts view this scenario as conceivable, citing American experts who claim that a missile 
defense of the U.S. national territory would be virtually impossible.53 While such an argument 
with respect to full territorial defense is quite true, defending against selected point targets—
namely, Russian nuclear missile silos—is a much more achievable task. Indeed, both the S-300 
and S-400 are reputed to possess counter-cruise missile capability.54 In short, missile defense 
uncertainties cut both ways, affecting American and Russian security planners alike, particularly 
in the case of non-nuclear planning, where military outcomes are likely to be much longer in 
duration. 
 
In considering to what extent the United States should accommodate Russian concerns about 
counterforce capabilities of CPGS and cruise missile systems in future bilateral negotiations, it is 
                                                
50 Ibid., 16. For a contrasting analysis of U.S. counterforce conventional strikes on Chinese nuclear forces, which 
reaches a different conclusion, see Tong Zhao, “Limiting Damage or Damaging Stability: Assessing Conventional 
Counterforce Strikes against Theater Nuclear Forces,” in Stephanie Spies and Mark Jansson, eds., Project on 
Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2011 Conference Series (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
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54 For technical details of the S-400, see Carlo Kopp, “Almaz-Antey 40R6/S-400 Triumf Self Propelled Air Defence 
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important to review what the New START treaty of 2010 concluded with respect to Russian 
concerns. In negotiations, the United States reportedly told the Russian side that they did not 
plan to deploy enough CPGS systems to threaten Russia’s strategic retaliatory capability.55 The 
preamble to the treaty, however, does state that both countries are “mindful of the impact of 
conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.”56 The U.S. side was willing to 
count ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads in the treaty’s limits as if they were 
nuclear. Importantly, this was done not because the U.S. side agreed with Russian concerns 
about the counterforce potential of such conventional weapons; rather, should the United States 
proceed to arm previously nuclear ballistic missiles with a conventional payload, it would be 
virtually impossible to know the difference between a nuclear- and conventional-armed missile, 
rendering treaty compliance problematic.57  
 
Should the Pentagon proceed to deploy what is very likely to be a niche capability, extant New 
START counting rules would apply if the choice is a missile that delivers reentry vehicle(s) on a 
ballistic missile trajectory. On the other hand, were the United States to deploy a boost-glide 
CPGS weapon—launched along a depressed trajectory using a hypersonic glide vehicle to 
deliver its weapons to the target—this new type of system would not be subject to New START 
counting rules. This is because the U.S. position is that unlike traditional ballistic missiles, the 
Russians could readily detect the difference, thus avoiding the threat ambiguity issue. But as 
James Acton has argued, such boost-glide systems still present escalatory risks. Still, in the case 
of a U.S. wish to deploy such a non-ballistic system, New START provides Russia with the right 
to question, in a Bilateral Consultation Commission, whether or not such a weapon should be 
subject to extant counting rules.58 As long as the United States remains committed simply to a 
niche capability, consenting to counting rules for such a limited deployment of boost-glide 
systems seems eminently reasonable.59 Should a future U.S. administration wish to deploy larger 
numbers of CPGS weapons, they should still be subject to counting rules despite the fact that 
larger numbers affect the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may prove difficult to accept for 
those nuclear advocates who today cannot imagine a stable world once nuclear arsenals dip 
below the level of 1,000 weapons.  
 
Russia’s concerns about threats emanating from large-scale Tomahawk deployments are not 
covered under New START. Transparency measures, including U.S.-Russian expert discussions 
about the feasibility and risks of various threat scenarios of concern to Russia, need to take place 
to allay Russian concern about the cruise missile threat. As noted before, Russian deployments of 
S-300/400 missile defenses would render the execution of such a threat dubious and incredibly 
risky. These concerns might grow over time, however, particularly as technologies emerge that 
might permit hypersonic cruise missiles—perhaps some with even global strike ranges—to 
become conceivable. As one possible measure to calm Russian fears, limiting the patrol areas of 
U.S. submarines—notably SSGNs each carrying 154 cruise missiles—to operate outside the 200 
nautical mile exclusive economic zone, which would effectively place enough SSGNs in a 
                                                
55 Woolf, op.cit., 37. 
56 Cited in ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Under Article 5 of the treaty, the U.S. would still reserve the right to develop and test such a weapon.  
59 Recalling the provenance of CPGS, Russia surely assumes that a future U.S. administration might be prone to go 
down a more robust path than perhaps the current administration is willing to entertain.  
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location where they are incapable of targeting Russian missile silos may be a useful idea to 
consider.60 Indeed, if hypersonic cruise missiles were to become capable of being launched from 
submarines, their range would be unlikely to match the current Tomahawk range of 2,500km, 
making even fewer if any Russian silos vulnerable to such a threat.  
 
Final Thoughts  
 
The only thing certain about future nuclear reductions is that they will require an unprecedented 
level of dialogue and transparency between and among the affected state parties to reach some 
accommodation that enables deeper cuts in each side’s nuclear arsenal. To achieve progress, 
parties must abstain from exaggeration by appreciating the distinction between what is 
hypothetically possible and realistically achievable when evaluating threat scenarios of gravest 
concern.  
 
But what seems certain is that making heretofore nuclear-only missiles also capable of delivering 
conventional warheads is fraught with the prospect of serious unintended consequences. For one 
example particularly pertinent to this paper, we must keep squarely in mind that to the extent that 
state parties to the Missile Technology Control Regime begin embracing the use of ballistic 
missiles for conventional missions—and even worse, for missions with only one hour of decision 
time before use—a strong precedent will be set for other states to emulate such behavior. One 
can surmise that the reason why cruise missiles did not find their way into the 2002 Hague Code 
of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles is that they were seen, especially by the 
Pentagon, as a weapon of great discrimination rather than mass destruction. Ballistic missiles 
may gain a similar reputation, even though everyone knows that both ballistic and cruise missiles 
are equally capable of delivering nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the 
consequence may be the unintended spread of ballistic missiles and accompanying strategic 
instability. Thus, when U.S. decisionmakers pause to consider the ramifications of any decision 
about deploying CPGS systems, they should broaden the scope of their perspective to include the 
effects on nonproliferation policy and missile proliferation.61 
 
Finally, the notion of prompt use of a highly precise intercontinental-range missile within an 
hour’s decision time powerfully conveys the longstanding American preference for dabbling 
with technological solutions to the exclusion of clear-headed strategic thinking. Here, American 
decision-makers would best avoid myopic thinking about the utility of CPGS as a silver bullet. It 
would be preferable to consider more fully the broad and unwelcome dangers and policy 
ramifications that could very well result from such narrow thinking. 
  
                                                
60 Dennis M. Gormley, “The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority,” 
Proliferation Papers, No. 29, Fall 2009, 43-44.  
61 Some analysts have argued that in light of China’s conventional missile buildup and the consequent threat to U.S. 
and allied forces in the region, it would serve U.S. interests to abandon the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) signed in 1987. Recent developments in Russia also suggest a most uncertain future for INF treaty’s longevity. 
Still, on balance there are compelling reasons to believe that a U.S. land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile 
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assessment reaching such a conclusion, see David W. Kearn, Jr., Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and 
the Future of the INF Treaty (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012).  
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Russia and Strategic, Conventional Weapons Concerns and 
Responses 
 
James M. Acton 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin must have a special place in his heart for the United States’ 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike program.62 He has publicly decried American plans to 
develop hypersonic, long-range, non-nuclear munitions on at least five occasions since they were 
first unveiled in 2006—including at such high-profile occasions as his State of the Nation 
address in December 2013.63 In that speech, he called the CPGS program out by name and stated 
that, in combination with ballistic missile defense, it “could negate all previous agreements on 
the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and disrupt the strategic balance of 
power.”64 
 
The level of personal attention that Putin is paying to the CPGS program is remarkable. To be 
sure, CPGS is hardly unique among U.S. weapon development efforts in attracting the Kremlin’s 
ire; Putin has complained about U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts far more often and just as 
hyperbolically. Rather, what is noteworthy is the deep level of concern that Russia’s president 
has for weapons that the United States has not yet decided to acquire, that are at least a decade 
away from deployment should a decision to procure them be made, and that have failed—either 
wholly or partially—in five or six of just seven tests to date.65 
 
To explain Putin’s interest, it is necessary to understand that there is a deeply embedded belief 
among many Russian officials and analysts that the development of prompt, long-range, 
conventional weapons marks a fundamental turning point in the nature of warfare. This belief 
                                                
62 Some of the material in this paper originally appeared in James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right 
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creates deep concern in Russia on multiple levels and is already affecting Russia’s military 




Russian analysts and officials tend to view hypersonic, long-range, non-nuclear weapons as part 
of a broader category of “strategic, conventional weapons.” This term is rarely defined, but is 
often used broadly to encompass the full range of high-precision standoff capabilities, whether 
prompt or not.66 As such, strategic, conventional weapons, which include cruise missiles and 
even guided gravity bombs, are already a reality for Russia. 
 
That said, for Russia, hypersonic weapons do appear to represent the “most strategic” of 
conventional weapons. As Putin’s remarks typify, Russia’s primary concern in this regard 
appears to be the CPGS program, which is currently focused on the development of hypersonic 
boost-glide weapons but has funded research into terminally guided conventional ballistic 
missiles. However, hypersonic cruise missiles (which are a bureaucratically separate effort from 
CPGS within the United States) and orbital weapons (of which the reusable X-37B unmanned 
orbiter is viewed in Russia as a prototype) are also regarded as worrying potential additions to 
the U.S. arsenal of strategic, conventional weapons.67 
 
There is a dramatic divergence between U.S. and Russian views about what Russia should worry 
about where hypersonic weapons are concerned. The most cogent argument within the United 
States against the development of certain hypersonic weapon systems has been the concern that 
Russia might mistake the launch of a conventionally armed system for a nuclear-armed system 
and launch a precipitous nuclear response.68 This problem—often termed the warhead ambiguity 
problem—came to the fore in 2006 when the administration of George W. Bush announced plans 
to replace the nuclear warheads on some Trident-D5 sea-launched ballistic missiles with 
conventional munitions and was the ostensible reason that Congress refused funding for that 
program. As a result, the U.S. Department of Defense refocused its research and development 
efforts on boost-glide weapons, which, it argued, would be distinguishable from nuclear weapons 
by their non-ballistic trajectory (whether this argument will prove persuasive to Congress will be 
seen if and when it is asked to provide funding for the acquisition of boost-glide weapons).  
 
Russian officials—including Putin himself—have raised the warhead ambiguity problem.69 They 
have also raised the possibility that, because boost-glide weapons are highly maneuverable, 
                                                
66 For example, Yevgeny Miasnikov, “Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons” in Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction 
and Nonproliferation, eds. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, trans. ed. Natalia Bubnova, (Moscow: Carnegie 
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Russia might mistake an attack against a state that borders Russia as an attack against Russia—a 
problem known as destination ambiguity in the American literature.70 However, Russia has a 
number of other concerns, operating across at least six levels, many of which appear to be more 
acute. The first three relate to strategic, conventional weapons in general, though are particularly 
acute where hypersonic weapons are concerned. 
 
Strategic, conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and Russia is falling 
behind. 
 
The effectiveness of U.S. precision-guided munitions in the 1991 Gulf War provided a rude 
awakening for Russia (and many other states, including China). It clearly illustrated that 
improvements in accuracy had revolutionized tactical strike capabilities and that the United 
States enjoyed a huge lead in the relevant technologies. Now Russian strategists appear to have 
concluded that ongoing improvements in conventional weaponry are similarly revolutionizing 
strategic strike capabilities. 
 
This belief appears to be held by even the most senior Russian decision-makers. For example, in 
a February 2012 article, Putin, who was Russia’s prime minister at that point, argued that, while 
nuclear deterrence should prevent large-scale aggression against Russia, 
  
We should take into account that technological progress in various areas, from new 
models of weapons and military hardware to information and communications 
technology, has fundamentally changed the nature of armed conflict. For instance, as 
high-precision long-range weapons with conventional charges become more common, 
they will become the means of achieving a decisive victory in conflicts, including a 
global conflict.71 
 
Russian experts and officials are often vague about how non-nuclear weapons might enable their 
possessors to achieve a decisive victory in a major conflict. They sometimes point to the 
increased usability of conventional compared to nuclear weapons, or the possibility of a 
conventional “first strike” against Russia’s nuclear forces (both of which are discussed further 
below). Most fundamentally, however, Russian strategists appear to believe that conventional 
weapons are now approaching nuclear weapons in their effectiveness. (Many American 
strategists, by contrast, argue that conventional weapons can now be employed for missions that 
have hitherto been exclusively nuclear; but very few argue that the two are directly comparable 
in their effects).  
 
For example, on June 19, 2013—just hours before U.S. President Barack Obama called for 
further nuclear reductions in Berlin—Putin personally emphasized concerns about the ongoing 
development of “high-precision conventional weapons systems that in their strike capabilities 
                                                                                                                                                       
www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/25909cfe1bbd1c6ec325777500339245?OpenDocum
ent); Anatoly Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons,” Security Index 19, no. 3 (2013): 
5. 
70 Yelena Chernenko, “Takiye Sistemy Budut Nosit’ Isklyuchitel’no Opasnyy Kharakter” [Such Systems Will Be 
Exceptionally Dangerous], interview with Sergei Ryabkov, Kommersant, December 12, 2013: 8. 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2366153. 
71 Putin, “Being Strong.” 
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come close to strategic nuclear weapons” in a “pre-buttal” of Obama’s proposals.72 Five months 
later, he went even further, declaring that “the degree of precision and power of today’s high-
precision weapons makes them essentially an alternative to nuclear weapons.”73 On neither 
occasion did Putin specify exactly to which weapons he was referring. However, Deputy 
Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov was more specific in an April 2013 interview, stating that 
 
The destructive capabilities of [CPGS weapons] are increasingly getting closer to those of 
nuclear weapons… incoming information unequivocally testifies to the fact that the 
United States is looking for a considerable new segment of its strategic arsenal capable of 
solving a wide range of tasks that used to be assigned exclusively to strategic nuclear 
weapons.74 
 
Moreover, the potential equivalence of nuclear and conventional weapons appears to be reflected 
in Russia’s own 2010 Military Doctrine, which states, in somewhat oblique terms, that “in the 
context of the implementation by the Russian Federation of strategic deterrence measures of a 
forceful nature, provision is made for the utilization of precision weapons.”75 
 
Concern about the destructive potential of hypersonic, long-range, conventional weapons is 
coupled with concern that Russia is lagging behind in their development. Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Rogozin reflected this fear in June 2013 when he is reported to have warned that 
Russia may “sleep through the new revolution.”76  
 
Strategic, conventional weapons—especially in combination with ballistic missile defense—
could undermine the survivability of Russia’s nuclear forces. 
 
The concern about which Russian officials and analysts are most vocal is the possibility that their 
nuclear forces might become vulnerable to U.S. conventional forces. These concerns are not 
purely focused on CPGS. Russian analysts have been very explicit in identifying a perceived 
threat from multiple forms of “precision-guided weapons,” including “long-range sea-launched 
and air-launched cruise missiles…and powerful air bombs and guided missiles, which can be 
delivered by U.S. heavy bombers and tactical aviation.”77 According to Vladimir Dvorkin, a 
retired Russian major general who served as head of a military institute devoted to modeling 
nuclear exchanges, such weapons “pose a threat to all branches of the strategic nuclear triad, 
including the silo and mobile launchers of the Strategic Rocket Forces…, strategic submarines in 
bases, and strategic bombers.”78 
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That said, over the last 18 months or so, there has been a very noticeable uptick of concern about 
the perceived potential impact of CPGS weapons on the survivability of Russia’s nuclear forces. 
Putin’s warning in his 2013 State of the Nation address that CPGS weapons could undermine 
nuclear arms control agreements is one high-profile example. The previous year, both Antonov 
and the commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, had made 
similar points, albeit in less ear-catching terms.79 
 
Putin’s and Antonov’s statements, along with many others, reference CPGS alongside ballistic 
missile defense. This is no coincidence. Moscow is particularly concerned that this combination 
could allow the United States to attempt a disarming first strike without crossing the nuclear 
threshold.80 Officials have sometimes outlined this concern explicitly. In 2007, for example, 
Antonov, who was then Director of the Security and Disarmament Department at Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in characteristically flamboyant terms that 
 
We see a direct link between U.S. plans for global missile defense and the prompt global 
strike concept which means the ability to strike any point on the globe within an hour of 
the relevant decision. This concept, when combined with global missile defense, becomes 
a means of seeking to dominate the world politically and strategically. This is a rather 
serious factor which undermines the principles of mutual deterrence and mutual security 
and erodes the architecture of strategic stability.81 
 
In fact, Russian concerns about conventional counterforce are now so acute that, according to 
Yevgeny Miasnikov, a Russian analyst who has written extensively on strategic, conventional 
weapons,  
 
A number of [Russian] experts believe that [precision-guided weapons] pose a greater 
threat to the survivability of Russian [strategic nuclear forces] over the medium term than 
do ballistic missile defenses, since over this timeframe no technological breakthroughs 
are anticipated that could significantly improve the effectiveness of [ballistic missile 
defenses] against [intercontinental ballistic missiles], while at the same time the United 
States has already amassed a considerable counterforce capability for its [precision-
guided weapons], which in the future will only grow.82 
 
For the time being at least, Russian analysts who argue that precision-guided conventional 
weapons pose a greater threat than ballistic missile defense to Russia’s nuclear forces appear to 
be in the minority. Indeed, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated explicitly in 
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December 2013 that ballistic missile defense remains “our first concern.”83 However, if U.S. 
missile defenses continue to be developed more slowly than planned (as the cancellation of phase 
four of the European Phased Adaptive Approach typifies) and Washington moves ahead with a 
CPGS acquisition program, it seems possible that high-precision conventional weapons could 
move ahead of ballistic missile defense and to the very center of Russian concerns. 
 
Strategic, conventional weapons are more usable than nuclear weapons. 
 
The greater “usability” of conventional weapons compared to nuclear weapons is another 
important aspect of Russian concerns. It results in a twin fear: that the United States is less 
inhibited in using conventional weapons than nuclear weapons, and that a Russian nuclear 
response to a conventional strike would lack credibility. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, for example, has argued that the development of “conventionally armed long-range 
missile systems will lead to a significant decrease in the ‘threshold’ for strategic missiles use.”84 
Meanwhile, Alexei Arbatov, an analyst and former Duma member, writes of an “unspoken 
assumption” among Russian analysts that “traditional nuclear deterrence may not be effective 
against conventional counterforce threats, since nuclear retaliation [by Russia]…would invite 
suicide by follow-on nuclear strikes [by the United States] and thus lacks credibility.”85 Arbatov, 
it should be noted, roundly rejects this analysis himself—elsewhere he emphasizes his belief that 
a Russian nuclear response would be sufficiently credible to deter a U.S. conventional first 
strike86—but he argues that few of his colleagues are as sanguine.  
 
Three further Russian concerns relate to hypersonic weapons specifically and not to the broader 
class of strategic, conventional weapons.  
 
The CPGS program is just too sophisticated to be about any state other than Russia. 
 
There is widespread disbelief in Russia that the development of long-range, conventional, 
hypersonic weapons by the United States is motivated by any state other than Russia. Arbatov, 
for example, argues that 
 
Russians just cannot believe that such complicated and expensive systems are only meant 
to target terrorists, who can be dealt with by much cheaper and simpler weapons. The 
idea that America needs weapons with short flight times to destroy reckless state leaders 
and terrorists looks ridiculous to most Russian experts.87 
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A handful of official documents and statements add fuel to the fire of Russian concerns. Taken 
as a whole, official U.S. pronouncements indicate very little interest in using U.S. conventional 
weapons to hold Russian nuclear forces at risk—but there are exceptions. For example, while he 
was the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. James Cartwright did publicly advocate 
for the substitution of nuclear with conventional weapons to enable further reductions.88 
Cartwright’s statements, and a few others from about the same time, still appear to contribute to 
a Russian perception that the United States wants to rely more heavily on conventional weapons 
in targeting Russia, its principle nuclear adversary.89 
 
CPGS delivery systems might be re-armed with nuclear warheads. 
 
The possibility that the high-precision delivery systems being developed under the CPGS 
program might be re-armed with nuclear warheads is a worry that the author has heard in many 
conversations with Russian experts and officials. Although it has not been openly discussed as 
much as other concerns, Antonov has raised it publicly.90 Importantly, it is distinct from the 
“classical” warhead ambiguity problem, which revolves around the difficulty of Russia’s 
distinguishing conventional weapons from superficially similar nuclear ones. Rather, Moscow’s 
worry here is that it might not be mistaken in identifying an incoming hypersonic weapon as 
nuclear-armed. There is a clear tension between this fear and the fear that the United States seeks 
strategic, conventional weapons because they are more usable than nuclear weapons.91 
 
Russian concerns that nominally non-nuclear weapons might be converted to carry nuclear 
warheads are not unprecedented. In 2009, for example, Robert Gates, who was then the U.S. 
secretary of defense, said in describing Russian objections to American missile defense plans 
that “the Russians believed, despite our best efforts to dissuade them, that the ground-based 
interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear weapons and become an offensive weapon.”92 
 
Russia would have very little warning of a boost-glide attack. 
 
A final concern, raised by more technically inclined experts, is that early-warning radars would 
provide much less warning of a boost-glide attack than a ballistic missile attack. This 
characteristic of boost-glide weapons is presumably a matter of general concern, but has been 
cited by Arbatov as a particular threat to Russia’s nuclear forces.93 Once again, this is a new take 
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on an old concern. During the Cold War, Moscow appeared to worry that forward-deployed 
nuclear-armed missiles, which could reach the Soviet Union much faster than Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) based in the United States, might be used for “strategic 
decapitation”—attacking command and control, and possibly leadership, in order to prevent 
Soviet nuclear forces from being used during an ongoing American first strike. The United 
States’ deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe in the 1980s sparked particular concern in 
this regard.94 
 
Russian Asymmetric Responses 
 
Russian views on strategic, conventional weapons—hypersonic ones in particular—appear to be 
influencing its military doctrine and procurement policies. One important doctrinal development 
is the threat to respond with nuclear weapons to CPGS attacks against Russia. The most 
important articulation of this doctrine came in December 2013 when Rogozin publicly stated that 
the United States “may experiment with conventional weapons on strategic delivery platforms, 
but they must bear in mind, that if we are attacked, in certain circumstances we will of course 
respond with nuclear weapons.”95 While this threat was unusually explicit—and notable for 
mentioning CPGS specifically—it appears to represent the exposition of an existing policy, 
rather than a new policy. In 2010, for example, Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute for 
American and Canadian Studies, and retired generals Viktor Esin, Pavel Zolotarev, and Valeriy 
Yarynich argued that concern about strategic, conventional weapons was “one of the reasons for 
lowering the ‘nuclear threshold’ in the official Russian Military Doctrine.”96 Some analysts and 
officials in Russia view tactical nuclear weapons as being particularly suitable for responding to 
an attack with strategic, conventional weapons.97 Once again, though, there is a definite tension 
here: this time between the belief that a nuclear response to a conventional attack would lack 
credibility and the threat to do just that.  
 
In terms of hardware, Russian officials have explained various aspects of Moscow’s ongoing 
military modernization as a direct response to CPGS. Two important foci of modernization—
perhaps its two most important—are Russia’s nuclear forces, and its air and missile defenses. 
Indeed, these efforts were the only specific programs highlighted by Putin in a September 2014 
speech (in which he also mentioned CPGS) delivered at a drafting session for the 2016-2025 
State Armament Program.98 After the meeting Rogozin went further and drew a direct link 
between CPGS and these programs, stating that “our response to the prompt global strike 
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strategy is upgrading our strategic nuclear forces…and also developing air and space defense 
resources.”99  
 
One notable aspect of Russia’s modernization of its nuclear forces is its decision to “develop a 
preliminary design” for a new rail-mobile ICBM. During the Cold War, Russia developed one 
such missile, the SS-24 (Scalpel), which was deployed from 1987 to 2005. The decision to revive 
this basing mode was announced in December 2013 by Karakayev, who directly connected it to 
the CPGS program and argued that a rail-mobile ICBM would offer advantages for 
survivability.100  
 
Russia is also engaged in a large-scale effort to improve its air and missile defenses.101 Its 2010 
Military Doctrine identifies one of the main tasks of Russia’s military as ensuring “the air 
defense of the Russian Federation’s most important military facilities and readiness to rebuff 
strikes by means of air and space attack.”102 Arbatov, Dvorkin, and the academic Sergei 
Oznobishchev argue that American strategic, conventional weapons are a major driver of this 
effort, noting that because 
 
There are currently no orbital weapons, and there is no prospect that they will appear in 
the foreseeable future, the notion “means of air and space attack” apparently relates to 
conventionally armed cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, with high precision guidance 
provided by space information systems.103 
 
Russian Symmetric Responses 
 
Given Putin’s belief that “high-precision long-range weapons…will become the means of 
achieving a decisive victory in conflicts,” it is hardly surprising that he has called for Russia to 
“design and adopt next-generation weapons and combat units, including high-precision weapons, 
whose capabilities…are close to those of nuclear deterrent forces.”104 Much of Russia’s work in 
this area appears to be focused on subsonic cruise missiles, including a ground-launched system 
that the United States has stated is in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
Treaty.105 However, Russia is working on hypersonic systems, too. It has acknowledged its 
development of hypersonic cruise missiles, even if details of its program remain murky.106 There 
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is also reasonably strong—but not completely conclusive—evidence that it is also engaged in the 
development of a conventional boost-glide system. 
 
In the last two years, a series of senior Russian officials have made statements that indicate an 
interest in developing conventional boost-glide weapons and have hinted that such efforts are 
already underway—although none has said so unambiguously. In December 2012, Karakayev 
announced that Russia’s planned new “heavy” ICBM would provide “the capability of creating a 
strategic high-accuracy weapon system with a conventional payload with practically global 
range, if the U.S. does not pull back from its program for creating such missile systems.”107 Four 
months later, in April 2013, Antonov stated (somewhat confusingly) that Russia had wanted to 
prohibit strategic, conventional arms but “taking into account the U.S. activity, Russia is forced 
to develop such arms in future.”108 In December of that year, the well-connected Russian 
journalist Yelena Chernenko, writing with Ivan Safronov, claimed that Russia was developing 
hypersonic, precision-guided weapons of an unspecified type or types. As evidence they quoted 
Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov as saying that “Americans may acquire these weapons at 
the turn of 2018. But by that time, we will be ready with our response.”109 Finally, immediately 
after complaining about CPGS in his State of the Nation address in December 2013, Putin stated 
that 
 
Russia will respond to all these challenges, both political and technological. We have all 
we need in order to do so. Our military doctrine and advanced weapons, weapons that are 
being and will be deployed, will unconditionally allow us to ensure the security of the 
Russian state.110 
 
Taken alongside the other statements, it seems likely that the “advanced weapons” that “will be 
deployed” include conventional boost-glide systems. (It is possible that these statements might 
refer to a conventionally armed ballistic missile, but such a weapon would not have “practically 
global range.”) 
 
Circumstantial evidence from negotiations over the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) in 2009 further supports this claim. Russia sought an outright ban on the emplacement 
of conventional warheads on ICBMs or sea-launched ballistic missiles (the United States and 
Russia eventually agreed to count such systems as nuclear armed). Surprisingly, however, Russia 
did not ask for the same provision to be applied to conventional boost-glide systems.111 One 
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possible interpretation is that, by 2009, Russia intended to create—or already had in place—a 
program to develop conventional boost-glide weapons and did not want them to be treaty 
accountable. 
 
There is also considerable evidence that Russia is actively engaged in a program to develop some 
type of maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV)—although it is unclear if this program is 
exclusively focused on ensuring that nuclear warheads can penetrate ballistic missile defenses or 
whether it has been expanded to encompass the development of a long-range conventionally 
armed boost-glide system.112 (MaRVs are any form of missile reentry vehicle capable of 
maneuvering; hypersonic gliders, which are a type of MaRV, are capable of significantly 
extending the missile’s range by remaining aloft for long distances. The development of a MaRV 
with limited gliding capability would be a natural first step toward acquiring a long-range 
glider.) 
 
Russian interest in boost-glide weapons has long historical roots. The Austrian aeronautical 
engineer Eugen Sänger first developed the concept prior to World War I. Following the war, 
Stalin reportedly became “infatuated” with the concept and tried (unsuccessfully) to “acquire” 
Sänger.113 Whether the Soviet Union made any progress on boost-glide technology during the 
early Cold War is unknown. However, it is reported to have begun developing (or perhaps re-
developing) less ambitious MaRV technology in the 1980s to deliver nuclear weapons out of 
concern that existing reentry vehicles might not be able to penetrate the highly effective defenses 
foreseen by President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program.114 
 
Russian efforts were revitalized at some point in the 1990s, apparently for similar purposes.115 A 
test of a hypersonic MaRV, as part of a major strategic forces exercise in February 2004, was 
publicized by the Russian government and widely reported.116 Reports about this test are, 
however, confusing and contradictory. Some claim that the reentry vehicle was launched by a 
solid-fueled SS-25 (Topol) missile;117 others that a liquid-fueled SS-19 (Stiletto) was used.118 
Given subsequent developments outlined below, the use of an SS-19 seems more likely. The test 
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was initially reported as a success. However, in February 2005, the missile designer Yuri 
Solomonov claimed that the reentry vehicle burned up in the atmosphere.119  
 
There are reports that this reentry vehicle was tested again in November 2005.120 However, if the 
booster for Russia’s MaRV is indeed the SS-19 then these reports were probably incorrect, since 
the November 2005 test involved either an SS-25 or SS-27 (Topol-M) missile.121 Indeed, other 
descriptions of this test simply make a generic mention of penetration aids, which are designed to 
defeat missile defenses but could perhaps be assumed to be a MaRV in sloppy reporting.122 
 
In 2007, Putin made a clear reference to Russian MaRV development when he was asked, at a 
press conference, about U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses in Europe. He first 
mentioned countermeasures on the nuclear-armed SS-27 before stating that Russia was 
developing “strategic weapons systems of a completely different type that will fly at hypersonic 
speed and will be able to change trajectory both in terms of altitude and direction, and missile 
defense systems will be powerless against them.”123 These comments are significant because 
they suggest that, at that time, Russia’s MaRV program was still focused on ensuring that 
nuclear warheads could be delivered through ballistic missile defenses and not on the 
development of a conventionally armed boost-glide weapon. 
 
Following these events, Moscow has been largely silent about this program. However, Pavel 
Podvig, an analyst who is widely recognized for his work on Russia’s strategic forces, has 
recently pieced together information about the program’s subsequent development from publicly 
available documents such as regulatory approvals.124 This information suggests that, since 2004, 
a hypersonic MaRV has been tested on at least two further occasions—in December 2011 and 
September 2013. Both tests used an SS-19 as the booster. The September 2013 test appears to 
have failed; no information is available on the outcome of the December 2011 test. 
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Podvig has also uncovered a program called Project 4202, which was created in about March 
2009 and involves a number of entities including NPO Mashinostroyeniya, the bureau 
responsible for designing the SS-19. Project 4202 appears to involve the modification of a silo to 
accommodate an SS-19 missile modified to carry an object designated 15Yu71, which may be a 
MaRV. Podvig’s evidence suggests that “production of the 15Yu71 (or at least some of its key 
components) will begin in 2015.”125 
 
Assuming that Podvig’s description is broadly correct, important questions about the 15Yu71 
remain, including its range and whether it is designed to deliver a conventional or nuclear 
warhead. Converting a MaRV designed to deliver a nuclear warhead—Russia’s original goal—
into one capable of delivering a conventional warhead might not be straightforward. In 
particular, it is unlikely that a reentry vehicle designed for a nuclear warhead would have the 
necessary accuracy for ensuring that a conventional warhead would be militarily effective. 
Moreover, if the objective is to design a boost-glide weapon with “practically global range” (to 
use Karakeyev’s goal) then the reentry vehicle would need to generate much more aerodynamic 
lift than would be required if its purpose was only to defeat missile defenses. Thus, while 
Russian research into MaRVs to defeat ballistic missile defenses would be helpful in developing 
a conventional boost-glide weapon, extensive further research and development would be 




For Moscow, the development of long-range, non-nuclear, hypersonic weapons represents a 
revolution in warfare that is profoundly threatening. In fact, many Russian officials and analysts 
appear to believe much more fervently in the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program’s 
potentially transformative impact than even its most vociferous advocates in the United States. 
Precisely because American efforts are viewed as so threatening, it comes as no surprise that 
Russia is considering developing its own hypersonic boost-glide weapons. Given Putin’s 
personal views on the potential military impact of these weapons, there is a good chance that 
Russian efforts enjoy his personal support and will eventually reach fruition. However, serious 
difficulties lie ahead. Russia’s development of a maneuvering reentry capable of penetrating 
ballistic missile defenses (a less challenging goal than a conventional boost-glide weapon) has 
been slow and there is evidence that it has been hindered by test failures. Moreover, a research 
and development program into conventional boost-glide weapons (which may already be 
underway) is likely to take at least a decade and would be extremely expensive, and possibly 
unaffordable. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume that Russia’s eventual acquisition of 
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Like the United States, China appears to be developing a variety of new hypersonic weapons 
systems, including a boost-glide weapon: a long-range strike system whose payload, a 
hypersonic glide vehicle, flies at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. Both countries 
now seem to have initiated HGV test programs. American efforts in this arena are an expression 
of its long-term pursuit of a conventional prompt global strike capability, rather than a new 
nuclear delivery system. China’s purposes are less evident. Nevertheless, if these two powers 
overcome the special technological challenges associated with boost-glide systems, the 
deployment of such systems can be expected to have implications for strategic stability.126 These 
concerns ought to be at the forefront of any considered analysis of the merits of boost-glide 
arsenals, their scale and posture, and the need for measures to mitigate associated risks.127  
 
Unfortunately, the United States and China currently lack a common perspective on the purposes 
and broader implications of these systems. Movement towards the deployment of boost-glide 
weapons by the United States may convince Chinese leaders to consider shifts in strategic 
posture, including a transition from keeping nuclear forces at low levels of alert during 
peacetime in favor of adopting launch-on-warning. Such a posture would introduce greater 
potential for miscalculation. China’s own pursuit of comparable systems adds further complexity 
and uncertainty to the picture; if nuclear-armed, their stability implications could be modest; if 
conventionally armed, they could compound existing risks. A lack of confidence on the Chinese 
side about the type of payloads carried by HGVs deployed on the opposite side of the Pacific can 
be expected to have deleterious effects.  
 
Hypersonic Weapons Development in China 
 
Relatively little is known about hypersonic weapons development programs in China, especially 
in comparison to publicly available information about the same category of activities in the 
United States. Perhaps the most concrete indication of the state of the art in China consists of 
reports of the construction of advanced wind tunnels associated with the China Academy of 
Sciences (CAS), which could potentially support the development of different hypersonic 
systems.128 Observers in the United States have previously hypothesized a connection between 
Chinese hypersonic wind tunnels and the development of the maneuvering reentry vehicle 
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associated with an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).129 What other types of systems might be 
under development in China is unclear. In recent years, Chinese researchers have published a 
variety of research articles modeling aspects of a variety of hypersonic vehicles, apparently with 
the development of its own systems in mind.130 Lately, news media accounts have also described 
two test-flights of an HGV.131 The details of the system remain obscure. In response to news 
media coverage, China’s Ministry of Defense so far has confined itself to stating, “Our planned 
scientific research tests conducted in our territory are normal. These tests are not targeted at any 
country and at any specific goals.”132 
 
In general, the Chinese defense establishment relies heavily on missiles, and is busily 
diversifying its arsenal. The Second Artillery Corps of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
controls a variety of land-based ballistic missiles, ranging from silo-based and mobile nuclear 
ICBMs for strategic deterrence against a great-power adversary to conventional theater systems 
for fighting wars, intimidating regional opponents, and keeping superior enemy forces at a 
distance. Supplementing this force, the PLA Navy (PLAN) appears to be on the verge of 
deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines.133 American analysts have long suspected 
that the Second Artillery may also be the most likely branch of the PLA to receive control of 
China’s direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons once they are deployed.134 Both the Second 
Artillery and the PLAN are adopting a diverse family of cruise missiles of growing 
sophistication, providing them with greater abilities to counter maritime threats and overcome 
missile defenses.135  
 
Where boost-glide systems would fit into this picture is unclear. Three broad possibilities are 
worth considering. One is primarily technological: if the United States and other advanced 
powers are investing in this technology, so, too must China, but what purpose it would ultimately 
serve remains to be fully defined. A second possibility is strategic in character, involving a 
nuclear-armed intercontinental force capable of under-flying midcourse ballistic missile defense 
(BMD), helping to ensure the ability to retaliate.136  
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The third possibility is that China is following the United States in pursuing a specifically 
conventional intercontinental capability. So far, there is little indication of a role for strategic 
conventional capabilities in Chinese strategic thinking. The sole precedent may be the 
development of a Chinese conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile.137 A precision-strike 
asset targeted against a key regional base would fit neatly into the “anti-access” strategy that 
American analysts ascribe to China. What role an intercontinental conventional capability might 
play is less apparent, although one American analyst has suggested that intermediate-range and 
intercontinental-range precision-strike capabilities together would offer China’s leaders “a 
flexible deterrent that could achieve strategic and operational effects against an enemy in a 
crisis.”138 Regardless, China has long taken technologically advanced states as role models for its 
own military and technological pursuits, in terms of types of systems if not always in numbers.139 
 
U.S.-Chinese Strategic Dynamics 
 
Some discussions of long-range conventional strike weapons, including boost-glide weapons, 
have tended to consider them in isolation: as presidential weapons, designed to be used anywhere 
on earth on a moment’s notice, and not necessarily in conjunction with any other forces.140 From 
the perspective of strategic stability, we should instead consider these weapons as part of an 
interrelated set of systems. These systems interact; how each side develops and postures its 
forces may influence how the other side does so and, especially in times of tension, incentives 
may arise to employ them before the other side does. These dynamics are sometimes described 
respectively in terms of “arms racing” or “arms stability” and “crisis stability” or “first-strike 
stability.” The two concepts are distinct but potentially related: an anticipation of a crisis-
stability problem might be a reason for a state to invest in new or expanded capabilities. The 
ensuing arms race deepens mutual mistrust and may contribute to the potential for conflict. 
 
Typically, these concepts have been applied to the interactions of nuclear forces, but the 
development of BMD, ASAT, and long-range conventional strike weapons – from ASBMs to 
boost-glide weapons – is bringing about a more complex set of interactions, in which one system 
type is “entangled” with another. To the extent that American specialists have focused on these 
issues, crisis-stability concerns have been paramount. Fear of nuclear coercion in a crisis, it is 
believed, could entice Chinese leaders to opt for ASAT strikes against orbital sensors associated 
with the U.S. BMD architecture; U.S. leaders, anticipating this danger, might decide to employ 
boost-glide weapons preemptively against Chinese ASAT systems. Fear of conventional 
coercion could work similarly, with Chinese leaders contemplating ASBM employment against 
approaching U.S. carrier strike groups, and U.S. leaders, understanding this possibility, weighing 
boost-glide attacks on ground-based assets in China that would support the targeting of U.S. 
naval vessels. Other factors raise concerns about the potential for inadvertently threatening 
China’s confidence in its ability to conduct nuclear retaliation in the course of a conventional 
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fight. These factors include China’s impending decision to take nuclear weapons to sea and 
apparent overlaps between the command and control of China’s nuclear and conventional 
forces.141  
 
The dominant Chinese conception of the strategic stability problem, by contrast, appears to focus 
almost exclusively on the threat of multiple U.S. strategic systems to Chinese nuclear forces. 
Chinese discussions have often packaged U.S. CPGS with BMD and nuclear weapons, on the 
reasoning that BMD and CPGS could threaten China’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, 
exposing it to nuclear coercion (“compellence”) in a crisis.142 This conception owes a debt to 
American thinking: the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review packaged long-range conventional strike 
together with nuclear weapons and defenses as parts of a still larger “New Triad.”143 Although 
this formula is no longer used, the 2010 posture review contained language about “maintaining 
an effective nuclear umbrella while placing increased reliance on non-nuclear deterrence 
capabilities (e.g., missile defenses and conventional long-range missiles).”144 This statement is at 
least consistent with the idea that these capabilities could work as an interrelated whole, although 
it does not specifically express it. 
 
Regardless of the pedigree of the concept, Chinese defense specialists appear increasingly seized 
by a threat from U.S. conventional long-range strike systems against Chinese strategic nuclear 
forces. A comparison of how PLA documents have treated conventional threats to nuclear forces 
in recent years may illuminate this point. A substantial section of a lengthy textbook from 2004, 
Science of Second Artillery Operations, discusses defensive operations, anticipating that the 
PLA’s conventional and nuclear missile forces are liable to come under attack from precision-
guided weapons based on land or sea, airstrikes, airborne forces, air assault forces,145 or special 
operations forces.146 Recently, the focus of these concerns has shifted in the direction of strategic 
strike, with CPGS in the leading role. The most recent (2013) edition of Science of Strategy, a 
textbook on military strategy produced by the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, is far less 
detailed in discussing missile operations and lacks this catalogue of threats and defensive 
operations. Nonetheless – and in distinction to the previous 2001 edition of the same publication 
– it makes room to describe the potential for the employment of CPGS weapons against Chinese 
nuclear missiles, noting that this event could expose the country to coercive nuclear threats, 
reinforced by BMD capabilities.147  
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Pressures on Chinese Nuclear Posture 
 
If Chinese defense planners have come to regard this emerging “complex counterforce” threat as 
sufficiently serious, it could influence both how Chinese leaders act in a crisis and how they 
choose to posture their strategic forces over the long term. All available information, including 
the Science of Second Artillery Operations, indicates that the Second Artillery’s current 
expectation is to ride out an attack, even in the unlikely event of a nuclear strike. According to 
the Department of Defense, the Second Artillery has built and maintains an extensive network of 
underground facilities (UGFs):  
 
Given China’s nuclear policy of ‘no first use’ and until recently its limited 
ballistic missile early warning capability, Beijing had assumed it might have to 
absorb an initial nuclear blow prior to engaging in ‘nuclear counterattack.’ 
Nuclear survivability was particularly critical given China’s relatively small 
number of nuclear weapons and the development by potential adversaries of 
modern, precision munitions. In recent years, advanced construction design has 
allowed militaries to go deeper underground to complicate adversarial 
targeting.148 
 
Nevertheless, a sufficiently robust precision-strike capability, supported by BMD, might shake 
the confidence of PLA leaders in these arrangements under certain circumstances. Previous study 
of this subject has reached more sanguine conclusions, but may be based on a misunderstanding 
of Chinese nuclear posture. A 2011 analysis by a Chinese civilian academic researcher concludes 
that while other forces are potentially vulnerable to conventional counterforce, the mobile 
nuclear missiles of the Second Artillery are effectively immune. These assets are presumed either 
to be hidden in UGFs or kept dispersed and camouflaged above ground.149  
 
In fact, it appears that the Second Artillery keeps its mobile missile units in recognizable, above-
ground garages under peacetime conditions. An open-source research project has identified what 
appear to be all the main bases of Second Artillery mobile nuclear missile brigades.150 
Reviewing these sites in Google Earth, along with other recent commercial satellite imagery, 
shows structures that open-source analysis has identified as missile garages. No obvious UGFs 
can be observed at these sites.151 Furthermore, it appears that most Chinese nuclear warheads are 
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stored at an underground central depot during peacetime, rather than mated to missiles.152 In 
peacetime, therefore, mobile nuclear missiles might be found unarmed in identifiable, exposed 
facilities. As explained in China’s 2008 Defense White Paper, “In peacetime the nuclear missile 
weapons of the Second Artillery Force are not aimed at any country. But if China comes under a 
nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force will go into a state of alert, 
and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against 
China.”153  
 
This statement offers a highly simplified rendering of what has been described elsewhere as a 
four-stage “ladder” of alerts.154 It also passes over the closely related issue of missile maneuvers. 
A section of Science of Second Artillery Operations is devoted to operational maneuvers; at 
progressively higher states of alert, mobile missiles relocate from main bases to launch sites. The 
text also notes in passing the use of “standby positions” short of actual launch positions.155 A 
small technical literature on mobile missile operations identified by a Chinese scholar similarly 
envisions a three-level system of operations involving “main sites,” “forward sites,” and “launch 
sites.” Mobile missile units are routinely located at main sites. Under higher alert status, the 
missile units would receive orders to disperse to the forward sites. When ordered to launch, they 
would move a second time, to actual launch sites.156 Protection and camouflage presumably 
come into play in the context of these movements away from the publicly recognized “main 
sites.” 
 
The reasons for maintaining vulnerable, recognizable, nuclear missile facilities might seem 
elusive to observers accustomed to the idea of a steady “day-to-day alert” in a survivable posture, 
but an explanation is available. As noted in the 2008 Defense White Paper, cited above, nuclear 
alerts are designed to deter the adversary during a crisis. These “counter-nuclear coercion” 
practices, which might be compared to the idea of “nuclear signaling,” are described at length in 
the Science of Second Artillery Operations. The text holds that visible missile activity of 
ambiguous purpose – or, in extremis, of bluntly stated purpose – will give an adversary serious 
pause.157  
Potential Chinese Responses 
 
The merits of alerting as a counter-nuclear coercion measure are open to question. According to 
one official American explanation of U.S. nuclear posture, “the generation of nuclear forces 
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during a crisis, when none had been on alert, could cause an already tense situation to become 
unstable.”158 But some of the alternatives that Chinese leaders may be contemplating in response 
to the prospect of conventional boost-glide deployments do not necessarily offer a net 
improvement from a crisis-stability perspective. Potential options could include the expansion of 
China’s nuclear arsenal, which is estimated to be an order of magnitude smaller than that of the 
United States159; planning for earlier missile deployments in a crisis than would otherwise be the 
case; or a decision (in “American” fashion) to keep at least a fraction of the force on higher alert 
during peacetime. Some combination of these three options is also possible. The advantages and 
drawbacks of each option can be briefly identified. 
 
First, some enlargement of the nuclear force is already underway, but China’s leaders appear 
determined, as a matter of national strategic outlook, to maintain a relatively small arsenal and 
not to engage in a nuclear arms race, regardless of other considerations.160 Incremental changes 
to operational practices appear more palatable.  
 
Earlier dispersal is one such possibility. The discussion of the timing of maneuvers in Science of 
Second Artillery Operations does indicate concern about the possibility of sending missiles into 
the field either too early or too late.161 It could be inferred that changes in the threat environment 
would lead to a change in PLA leaders’ calculations about the balance between these risks. Yet a 
“tilt” to earlier deployments in a crisis, effectively embracing a deeper reliance on “counter-
nuclear coercion” operations, could be self-defeating. An early resort to missile maneuvers 
would shrink any opportunity for preemption, but could also intensify a crisis that otherwise 
might subside.  
 
Under the circumstances, pursuing a transition from “counter-nuclear coercion” to a “day-to-day 
alert” status would presumably provide greater stability. Here, however, the small scale of the 
Chinese arsenal introduces a complication. The combination of conventional, nuclear, and BMD 
threats to China’s retaliatory capability could lead to cases in which the surviving fraction of 
PLA nuclear forces might not necessarily be expected to overwhelm BMD systems.  
 
One answer to this risk would be to take additional measures to ensure the ability to retaliate. 
The PLAN could keep at least one ballistic missile submarine on patrol at all times, while the 
Second Artillery could adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, allowing it to perform its 
nuclear counterstrike before the adversary’s first strike arrives. This approach would maximize 
the PLA’s chances of overwhelming an opponent’s BMD. There are reasons to believe such a 
transition may be underway. First, the scale of the PLAN’s ballistic missile submarine 
deployments, which DOD expects to reach up to five hulls in the current class, suggests an 
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interest in continuous patrolling.162 Second, the 2013 edition of Science of Strategy specifically 
identifies LOW as a viable option for PLA nuclear forces, judging it to be consistent with 
China’s longstanding NFU policy.163  
 
A shift to continuous patrolling of submarines and LOW for land-based missiles cannot happen 
instantaneously, as these elements of posture would require advanced command-and-control and 
early-warning systems. They would also require a new level of comfort with routinely deploying 
nuclear warheads mated to missiles. But if these changes should come to fruition, they would 
appear to detract from crisis stability, not to enhance it. In particular, PLA nuclear forces poised 
to launch would be subject to the same problems of false warning that have occurred elsewhere, 
particularly in the Soviet/Russian system.164  
 
Chinese strategic forces would also be subject to the potential for misconstruing conventional 
attack as nuclear attack, sometimes called “warhead ambiguity.” Even with the ability to 
distinguish ballistic missiles from boost-glide missiles, the PLA would not know what payloads 
attacking U.S. missiles carried. It might not even be possible to rely on Russian assurances about 
payloads, as the United States holds that boost-glide missiles would fall outside the definition of 
ballistic missiles in the New START Treaty and would therefore not be subject to any of its 
provisions, including Russian inspections.165 
 
Implications and Uncertainties 
 
The pressures that U.S. boost-glide deployments would place on the Chinese strategic posture, in 
conjunction with other force types and self-imposed constraints on the scale and use of China’s 
nuclear arsenal, are potentially significant, with deleterious effects on crisis stability.  
 
China’s own apparent decision to pursue boost-glide systems adds a layer of complexity and 
uncertainty to the problem. If these systems simply come to represent a new nuclear delivery 
mode for the PLA’s Second Artillery, designed to complement ballistic missiles by under-flying 
BMD—and if the United States could be confident about this point—they could contribute 
marginally to strategic stability.  
 
If some or all PLA boost-glide weapons are conventionally armed, or if the United States is 
uncertain about their payloads, they would have the opposite effect. A substantial 
intercontinental precision-strike arsenal in an all-purpose war fighting and deterrence role would 
present the United States with a new dilemma: China’s vast lead in UGFs would offer it an 
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asymmetric advantage in a crisis or conflict. Even a limited number of boost-glide assets might 
be well-suited to strike ground-based radars associated with the U.S. BMD system. This type of 
capability would compound the problems of operational entanglement and crisis stability that the 
introduction of BMD, ASAT, and ASBM capabilities has already brought to the relationship.  
 
Taken together with these other developments, boost-glide development on both sides of the 
Pacific could be seen as just one feature of an ongoing multi-pronged qualitative arms race. The 
pursuit and introduction of new strategic military technologies, free of limitations or 
transparency measures, is creating new operational realities, but not a common understanding of 
their nature or extent. Restraint in the deployment of novel weapons would be helpful, but 
difficult to achieve in the face of mutual mistrust and the lack of an established arms-control 
relationship. Calls for new confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency to 
ease these concerns and manage risks have already been voiced.166 Continued testing of HGVs in 
the United States and China offers another reason to listen. 
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